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Hodges: Prenuptial Transfers in Fraud of Dower

NOTES
PRENUPTIAL TRANSFERS IN FRAUD OF DOWER
Dower is a child of antiquity, "so ancient that neither Coke nor
Blackstone [could] trace it to its origin."I Fortunately for the lawyer
of today, the enigmatic common law concept of dower as a property
right of the wife has been greatly changed by statutes which define
the scope and extent of its application. One example of such legislation is section 731.34 of Florida Statutes 1957.2 Pursuant to this
statute, a widow who becomes disgruntled with her testate or intestate
share in her deceased husband's estate may elect instead to claim a
one-third share in all real and personal property, excluding homestead, owned by the husband at his death, and in all realty conveyed
during coverture in which she did not relinquish her dower. Equally
important and in addition to her statutory dower, a wife possesses an
analogous right in property for maintenance and support during
coverture. 3
GENERAL RULE

The magnitude of a wife's dower and other marital property rights,
zealously guarded by the courts, is illustrated by the general rule,
4
which may be stated as follows:
A voluntary conveyance by either party to a marriage contract, made without the knowledge of the other, and on the
eve of or in contemplation of marriage, is a fraud upon the
other's marital rights.
The stunning characteristic of this rule is that it operates to protect
a property right that has not even attained the status of an expectancy at the time of attempted destruction by prenuptial transfer. Even
'Combs v. Young, 12 Tenn. 180, 188 (1833), cited in I SCRIBNER, DOWER §1,
n.1 (2d ed. 1883).
2Enacted in 1933 and amended in 1943, 1945, and 1953.
3See, e.g., Murray v. Murray, 115 Cal. 266, 47 Pac. 37 (1896); Goff v. Goff, 60
W. Va. 9, 53 S.E. 769 (1906).
4See, e.g., Davis v. Davis, 98 So.2d 777 (Fla. 1957); Collins v. Collins, 98 Md. 473,
57 Ati. 597 (1904); Ward v. Ward, 63 Ohio St. 125, 57 N.E. 1095 (1900).
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after marriage, the wife's dower is inchoate, a mere expectancy to be
realized only if she survives her husband.5 Consequently, the prospective wife's right can only be described as an expectancy of an expectancy; yet the majority of jurisdictions give her an interest.6 As already indicated, the rule is also applied to protect marital rights of
the wife other than dower. For example, in divorce and separate
maintenance actions in which alimony or a property settlement is
sought, the wife is alloted her share in fraudulently transferred prop7
erty.
This seemingly harsh and sometimes criticized s rule is justified by
the courts on the basis of the confidential or fiduciary relationship
which is said to exist between prospective spouses.9 Hence, the majority of states,'- including Florida," have adopted the general rule
as stated above, though interpretations of the several elements within
the rule often vary.
ANALYSIS OF THE RULE

Voluntary Conveyance
In attacking a premarital transfer, the first element of the general
rule requires a showing that the conveyance was "voluntary," or
without consideration. Most of the cases in which the validity of a
prenuptial conveyance is questioned involve a widower with several
children who conveys his property to the offspring shortly before his
second matrimonial venture.' 2 The consideration usually recited for
such transfers is merely "love and affection."' 3 If the other elements
5Thomas v. Blair, 208 Ala. 48, 93 So. 704 (1922).
6See, e.g., Leonardo v. Leonardo, 251 F.2d 22 (D.C. Cir. 1958); Vordick v. Kirsch,
216 S.W. 519 (Mo. 1919); Goff v. Goff, 60 W. Va. 9, 53 S.E. 769 (1906).
7Kavanaugh v. Kavanaugh, 279 Mass. 238, 181 N.E. 181 (1932); Goff v. Goff,
supra note 6.
85 ALA. L. REv. 139 (1952).
9See Ward v. Ward, 63 Ohio St. 125, 57 N.E. 1095 (1900).
'oE.g., Jarvis v. Jarvis, 286 Ill. 478, 122 N.E. 121 (1919); Martin v. Martin, 282
Ky. 411, 138 S.W.2d 509 (1940); Stansberry v. Stansberry, 102 Neb. 489, 167 N.W.
563 (1918).
"'See Davis v. Davis, 98 So.2d 777 (Fla. 1957); McIntyre v. McIntyre, 92 So.2d
835 (Fla. 1956) (discussed in Davis v. Davis, supra at 778); Lange v. Lange, 133
Fla. 447, 182 So. 807 (1938).
"2See, e.g., Roberts v. Roberts, 131 Ark. 90, 198 S.W. 697 (1917); Lange v.
Lange, 133 Fla. 447, 182 So. 807 (1938); Weller v. Collier, 199 S.W. 974 (Mo. 1918).
13See, e.g., Leonardo v. Leonardo, 251 F.2d 22 (D.C. Cir. 1958); Collins v. Collins,
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of the rule are satisfied, these transfers are generally held fraudulent
to the prospective spouse. 14 There are some cases, however, in which
the courts have, in effect, found consideration for the conveyance in
view of compelling equities. Adequate provision for the second
spouse despite the prenuptial transfer, 15 dire need of the children by
the former marriage,26 the fact that the former wife contributed
largely to the property conveyed, 1 and the fact that the conveyance
constitutes payment of a legal obligation- are examples of the compelling equities that lead the courts to uphold the transfer.
Knowledge
If it can be shown that the prospective spouse had "knowledge"
of the prenuptial transfer, it will not be set aside even though the
other elements of the rule exist.1 9 Definitions of the word knowledge
as used in this context are rare, probably because it is predominantly
a question of fact to be determined at the trial level. When a prospective spouse acquires actual knowledge of a premarital transfer,
the courts uniformly uphold the conveyance, since the wife ratifies,
in effect, by thereafter consummating the marriage.20 A recent Florida
decision, Davis v. Davis,21 liberalized the concept of knowledge in
favor of the premarital transferor by holding that mere record
notice of the transfer prior to the marriage may be sufficient to give
the prospective spouse "knowledge," thus validating the transfer.
Obviously, in cases in which the premarital transfer is not recorded
until after the marriage, the objecting spouse is not bound with
knowledge; 22 but postnuptial recording might start the period of
limitations or laches running on the defrauded spouse's cause of
action.23 Recordation as a device employed to bind the prospective
98 Md. 473, 57 Ad. 597 (1904); Ward v. Ward, 63 Ohio St. 125, 57 N.E. 1095 (1900).
14See note 13 supra.
'5Rose v. Union Guardian Trust Co., 300 Mich. 73, 1 N.W.2d 458 (1942).
16Kinne v. Webb, 54 Fed. 34 (8th Cir. 1893).
17Payne v. Tatem, 236 Ky. 306, 33 S.W.2d 2 (1930).
18Dudley v. Dudley, 76 Wis. 567, 45 N.W. 602 (1890).
'ODaniher v. Daniher, 201 Ill.
489, 66 N.E. 239 (1903); Clark v. Clark, 183 Ill.
448, 56 NE. 82 (1899); Smiley v. Smiley, 114 Ind. 258, 16 N.E. 585 (1888).
20See note 19 supra.
2198 So.2d 777, 779 (Fla. 1957) (dictum).
22See, e.g., McIntyre v. McIntyre, 92 So.2d 835 (Fla. 1956) (discussed in Davis
v. Davis, 98 So.2d at 778); Kavanaugh v. Kavanuagh, 279 Mass. 238, 181 N.E. 181
(1932); Courts v. Aldridge, 190 Okla. 29, 120 P.2d 362 (1941).
23See discussion under heading "Limitations on the Cause of Action;" infra.
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spouse with knowledge of the transfer is, of course, unavailable when
no recording procedure is afforded. This is usually the case in transfers of personalty. Hence, the general rule as applied to a conveyance
of personalty requires that the future spouse be given actual knowledge, although it has been held in at least one case that prenuptial
transfers of personalty are not encompassed by the rule at all.24
Contemplationof Marriage
The question of whether the allegedly fraudulent transfer was
made "on the eve of or in contemplation of marriage" is the element
of the rule that gives rise to the major issue in the cases. 25 The
courts have applied the rule to set aside transfers made on the "eve
of marriage" without considering whether the transferor was actually
engaged or otherwise contemplating matrimony. Conveyances made
on the day of marriage,26 one day,27 three days, 28 five days,29 sixteen
4
3
32
days, 30 nineteen days, 31 twenty days, twenty-five days, 3 fifty days'
35
and sixty-two days prior to the marriage have all been held to be on
the "eve of marriage," and hence within this element of the rule
without further proof.
If a conveyance is made in contemplation of marriage, as evidenced by engagement, it will come within the rule even though the
transfer is too remote to be considered as made on the eve of marriage. 36 This is illustrated by a Kentucky case 7 in which a conveyance
made eighteen months before marriage, but during the engagement,
24Fritz' Estate, 135 Pa. Super. 463, 5 A.2d 601 (1939).
25See, e.g., Davis v. Davis, 98 So.2d 777 (Fla. 1957); Jarvis v. Jarvis, 286 I. 478,
122 N.E. 121 (1919).
26Harrison v. Harrison, 198 Ark. 64, 127 S.W.2d 270 (1939).
27Roberts v. Roberts, 131 Ark. 90, 198 S.W. 697 (1917).
2sGedart v. Ejdrygiewicz, 305 Mass. 224, 25 N.E.2d 371 (1940).
29Ward v. Ward, 63 Ohio St. 125, 57 N.E. 1095 (1900), questioned in MacLean
v. The J. S. MacLean Co., 123 N.E.2d 761 (Ohio P. Ct. 1955).
3OWeller v. Collier, 199 S.W. 974 (Mo. 1918).
3lGoff v. Goff, 60 W. Va. 9, 53 S.E. 769 (1906).
32Collins v. Collins, 98 Md. 473, 57 Ad. 597 (1904).
23Rubin v. Myrub Realty Co., 244 App. Div. 541, 279 N.Y. Supp. 867 (1st Dep't

1935).
34Kavanaugh v. Kavanaugh, 279 Mass. 238, 181 N.E. 181 (1932).
35Leonardo v. Leonardo, 251 F.2d 22 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
36See Gedart v. Ejdrygiewicz, 305 Mass. 224, 25 N.E.2d 371 (1940); Weller v.
Collier, 199 S.W. 974 (Mo. 1918).
37Murray v. Murray, 90 Ky. 1, 13 S.W. 244 (1890).
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was declared fraudulent. Although an engagement satisfies the contemplation requirement, a transfer has also been held within the rule
if at the time of the conveyance the transferor was not engaged but
merely contemplating matrimony -the transfer in this instance occurring a full twenty-two months prior to the nuptials. 38
The Florida cases involving premarital transfers indicate that the
Supreme Court will require a showing that the transfer was made on
the eve of the marriage or during the engagement.3 9 In McIntyre v.
Mcintyre,40 for instance, the Court held a transfer made twenty-five
days before the wedding to be fraudulent, other requirements of the
rule being satisfied. There was no mention of an engagement. The
same principle operated in Lange v. Lange4' to exonerate a conveyance made six years prior to matrimony at a time when the transferor was still married to his former spouse. Similarly, in Davis v.
Davis the Court was concerned with a transfer executed nine months
prior to a remarriage of the parties. It was upheld because the
transfer was too remote to be considered as made on the "eve" of
the marriage, and no engagement was shown.
Fraud
When it is shown that a premarital transfer was made without consideration, without the knowledge of the prospective spouse, and on
the eve of or in contemplation of marriage, has fraud been sufficiently
established for the court to set aside the conveyance? This question
has caused the greatest conflict among the cases; it has been answered
in three different ways. Some states have held that once the objecting
spouse has proved the three other elements of the rule, fraud is conclusively presumed and the transfer will be set aside without further
proof.4 2 Other jurisdictions hold that these facts constitute only a
prima facie showing of fraud and the burden of proof is shifted to
the defendant to vitiate the presumption. 43 A third group of cases
3sJarvis v. Jarvis, 286 Ill. 478, 122 N.E. 121 (1919).
39See Davis v. Davis, 98 So.2d 777 (Fla. 1957).
4092 So.2d 835 (Fla. 1956) (discussed in Davis v. Davis, 98 So.2d at 778).
41133 Fla. 447, 182 So. 807 (1938).
42See, e.g., Harrison v. Harrison, 198 Ark. 64, 127 S.W.2d 270 (1939); Kavanaugh v. Kavanaugh, 279 Mass. 238, 181 N.E. 181 (1932); Stansberry v. Stansberry,
102 Neb. 489, 167 N.W. 563 (1918).

43See, e.g., Bozarth v. Bozarth, 399 IlI. 259, 77 N.E.2d 658 (1948); Ellet v. Farmer,
584 Ill. 343, 51 N.E.2d 570 (1943); Murray v. Murray, 90 Ky. 1, 13 S.W. 244 (1890).
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requires proof of actual fraud and holds that the other elements of
the rule are merely facts tending to establish fraud and are not suf44
ficient to give rise to a presumption or to shift the burden of proof.
It is often difficult to ascertain from the opinions whether a court is
following the first or second view - conclusive or presumptive fraud but the probable weight of authority, 4s and Florida's rule, seems to
be that when the elements of the rule are found to exist, fraud is
conclusive.
After it has been decided that the rule is otherwise applicable and
that fraud has been established, is it necessary to show that the fraudulent transferor had a particular prospective spouse in mind at the time
of transfer? Again the cases are at odds. One view would avoid the
transfer if at the time of conveyance the transferor had a fraudulent
intent as established by the rule, even though he did not have a
particular spouse in mind.47 The Florida Court, however, will not
set aside the conveyance unless it is shown that the spouse challenging
the transfer is the same spouse the fraudulent transferor had in mind
at the time of the prenuptial conveyance.48
The rights of the grantee of a prenuptial conveyance and the effect
on his interest of setting the transfer aside are almost never discussed
in the opinions. The courts undoubtedly feel that once lack of consideration is shown, the grantee is necessarily precluded from the category of bona fide purchaser and has no right to object if the conveyance is voided. On the other hand, at least one jurisdiction requires a
specific allegation that the grantee had knowledge of the fraud involved in the transfer. 49
LIMITATIONS ON THE CAUSE OF AGrION

An action brought to set aside a prenuptial transfer generally requires equitable jurisdiction. 50 Hence, the period of limitations is
44See, e.g., Leonardo v. Leonardo, 251 F.2d 22 (D.C. Cir. 1958); Patton v.
Patton, 351 Pa. 6, 39 A.2d 921 (1944); Kirk v. Kirk, 340 Pa. 203, 16 A.2d 47 (1940).
45See note 42 supra.
4sSee Davis v. Davis, 98 So.2d 777 (Fla. 1957).
47See Ellet v. Farmer, 384 Il1. 343, 51 N.E.2d 570 (1943); Martin v. Martin, 282
Ky. 411, 138 S.W.2d 509 (1940).
48See Davis v. Davis, supra note 46; Lange v. Lange, 133 Fla. 447, 182 So. 807
(1938).
49Dorrough v. Grove, 257 Ala. 609, 60 So.2d 342 (1952).
5OSee Roberts v. Roberts, 131 Ark. 90, 198 S.W. 697 (1917); Davis v. Davis,
supra note 46; Collins v. Collins, 98 Md. 473, 57 Atl. 597 (1904).
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laches, which is by analogy determined by the applicable statute of
limitations,-' if one exists. Presumably, most states have two statutes
that might apply - one placing a time limit on a widow's election of
dower after her interest has become consummate upon the death of
her husband, and another limiting the period of time in which
causes of action based on fraud can be brought. The problem of
which of these statutes applies to the cause of action here in question
is a puzzle left unsolved by the two cases which have dealt with it.
A recent Missouri decision 52 held that a widow seeking to avoid a
premarital transfer made by her husband some thirty-six years before
the suit was filed was not barred, because her cause of action accrued
at his death and her case was brought within the period allowed for
electing dower. This decision is arguably unsound, however, since
the court ignored the fact that her cause of action was based on fraud
and that she could have sued at any time during the marriage to
establish her inchoate interest in the transferred property, without
waiting until her dower became consummate at the husband's death a situation grossly different from the usual case involving election of
dower. A 1950 New York case 53 held that a widow who had known
of a fraudulent prenuptial transfer for four years prior to her
husband's death could not challenge the conveyance. The
result was apparently based on laches, since no statute of limitations was mentioned. This reasoning seems preferable, logically speaking, to that of the Missouri case, since it recognized that the wife's
cause of action arose before her dower became consummate.
Section 95.11 (5) (d) of Florida Statutes 1957 provides that any
action based on fraud must be instituted within three years from the
time the fraud is discovered. Since each of the Florida cases involving
fraudulent prenuptial transfers was promptly instituted after discovery of the fraud,54 the Supreme Court has not been confronted
with the question of limitation. Literally construed, the above statute
would seem to apply to the wife's cause of action to establish her
dower in fraudulently conveyed property. Nevertheless, in a situation involving consummate dower the Court could conceivably choose
510'Byrne v. Scofield, 120 Colo. 572, 212 P.2d 867 (1949); Wall v. Johnson, 78
So.2d 371 (Fla. 1955); Slade v. Barber, 200 Ga. 405, 37 S.E.2d 143 (1946).
52Bresbears v. Breshears, 360 Mo. 1057, 232 S.W.2d 460 (1950).
531n re Ramsey's Estate, 98 N.Y.S.2d 918 (Surr. Ct. 1950).
54See Davis v. Davis, 98 So.2d 777 (Fla. 1957); McIntyre v. McIntyre, 92 So.2d
835 (Fla. 1956) (discussed in Davis v. Davis, supra at 778); Lange v. Lange, 133 Fla.
447, 182 So. 807 (1938).
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to follow the Missouri decision previously discussed and apply section
731.35 (3). This statute allows a widow to elect dower only within
nine months after the first publication to creditors or within three
years after the husband's death, whichever occurs first.
EXTENT OF TRANSFER SET ASIDE

Should a fraudulent prenuptial transfer be set aside in toto or
only to the extent of the defrauded wife's interest in the property?
This would seem to be a question of vital importance, yet it goes
curiously unmentioned in most of the cases. Most opinions conclude
with a simple statement that the conveyance was fraudulent and
should be set aside55 - presumably meaning in toto. In one wellreasoned opinion,56 however, it was held that if the wife's dower is
still inchoate at the time of suit, the entire conveyance should be
avoided in order to protect the wife fully, since the total extent of her
rights cannot be determined until the husband dies and her dower
becomes consummate. In cases in which the dower right of the challenging wife has become consummate, however, the transfer should
be set aside only to the extent of her statutory share, which became
fully ascertained at the husband's death. 57 This reasoning seems to
have the force of logic, particularly in the case of dower consummate,
in which it is unnecessary to hold the transfer totally void in order
to afford the wife her maximum share.
CONCLUSION

Cases involving premarital transfers in fraud of dower are legion,
yet analysis of these opinions in legal periodicals has been scanty.
This is undoubtedly true to a large extent because the courts, each
following the same general rule, seem to be harmonious. In looking
beneath the surface, however, it becomes readily apparent that there
are varied interpretations of the elements comprising a fraudulent
conveyance - divergent rules within the rule. It is by way of these
interpretations of the elements forming the general rule that some
courts have undertaken to relax an oftentimes harsh principle. For55See Harrison v. Harrison, 198 Ark. 64, 127 S.W.2d 270 (1939); Kavanaugh v.
Kavanaugh, 279 Mass. 238, 181 N.E. 181 (1932); Weller v. Collier, 199 S.W. 974 (Mo.

1918).
56Vordick v. Kirsch, 216 S.W. 519 (Mo. 1919).
57d. at 520 (dictum).
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